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The Charter versus the
Government’s Crime Agenda
Kent Roach*
I. INTRODUCTION
At the 25th anniversary of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 I posed a “Charter reality check” and asked how relevant the
Charter was to the justness of our criminal justice system. After examining rates of imprisonment, pre-trial detention, imprisonment of Aboriginal people, crime victimization and wrongful convictions, I concluded
that “Parliament deserves much of the credit or blame for the state of our
criminal justice system”.2 Despite the important changes that the Charter
has brought to the criminal justice system,3 the Charter played a minimal
role in explaining why Canada did not move towards American-style
reliance on imprisonment. What was in 2008 something of an academic
exercise has taken on a new relevance and urgency in 2012, given the
ability of the majority Conservative government to enact a dizzying array
of new crime control measures.

*
Professor of Law and Prichard Wilson Chair in Law and Public Policy, University of
Toronto. I thank Jamie Cameron, Jonathan Rudin and Sonia Lawrence for helpful comments on an
earlier draft.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
Kent Roach, “A Charter Reality Check: How Relevant Is the Charter to the Justness of
Our Criminal Justice System?” in J. Cameron & J. Stribopoulos, eds. (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 717, at
719.
3
Despite recent changes, the Court continues to enforce a quite robust constitutional exclusionary rule. See R. v. Côté, [2011] S.C.J. No. 46, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 215 (S.C.C.). The Charter has
also abolished constructive murder and some restrictive defences, and may have prevented the reintroduction of the death penalty: R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.).
But for arguments that the Court has been less robust in constitutionalizing fault under the Charter
than under the common law, see Kent Roach, “Mind the Gap: Canada’s Different Constitutional and
Common Law Standards of Fault” (2011) 61 U.T.L.J. 545 [hereinafter “Roach, ‘Mind the Gap’”].
On the death penalty, see United States of America v. Burns, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R.
283 (S.C.C.). For arguments that the Court could have done more under the Charter to recognize the
dangers of wrongful convictions, see Kent Roach, “The Protection of Innocence under Section 7 of
the Charter” in J. Cameron, P. Monahan & B. Ryder, eds. (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 249.
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In this paper, I will provide a preliminary assessment of the interaction of the Charter and the government’s crime agenda. After the Court’s
Insite decision requiring the Minister of Health to grant an exemption
from drug laws to allow a safe injection site to operate,4 and to a lesser
extent after an Ontario judge struck down a mandatory minimum
sentence for a firearm offence,5 there has been talk about coming
confrontations between the courts and the government over crime
policy.6 I have no doubt that there will be some such conflicts in the
coming years. I must, however, sound a note of caution about how much
judges enforcing the Charter will restrain the government’s “tough on
crime” policy.
Many of the new laws shrewdly capitalize on the deference of courts
to the exercise of prosecutorial and sentencing discretion. Although
courts may intervene in egregious examples of misuse of such discretion,
they will probably remain quite deferential with respect to most of the
government’s initiatives. Even though most Charter litigation involves
the criminal justice system, and many on both the right and the left have
expressed concerns about the growth of judicial power in Canada, a
majority government can still enact radical change in the justice system
if it is smart enough to focus on empowering prosecutors and limiting the
sentencing discretion of judges.
The second part of this paper will examine the use of the Charter to
challenge the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and in particular how
the government’s crime agenda provides prosecutors with de facto
sentencing power. It will suggest that the Charter will not effectively
supervise the discretion of prosecutors to elect between prosecutions by
summary conviction and by indictment, even though such decisions will
be critical in determining what level of mandatory minimum sentences
will apply and whether conditional sentences will be available. The third
part of this paper will examine a variety of Charter arguments that can be
used against new mandatory minimum sentences, including innovative
new section 7 arguments that such penalties may be arbitrary and/or
grossly disproportionate, and more traditional arguments that mandatory

4
Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2001] S.C.J. No. 44,
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 134, (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Insite”].
5
R. v. Smickle, [2012] O.J. No. 612, 2012 ONSC 602 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Smickle”].
6
Kirk Makin, “Landmark Insite decision threatens peace between judges and legislators”
The Globe and Mail (October 10, 2011); Adrian Humphreys, “Tory gun laws in jeopardy after judge
rejects ‘outrageous’ mandatory sentence” National Post (February 13, 2012).
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sentences may impose disproportionate punishment for particular
offenders who commit crimes in extenuating circumstances.

II. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
1. The Crown’s Discretion to Elect to Prosecute by Summary
Conviction or Indictment
One of the key provisions in the recently enacted Bill C-10 provides
that conditional sentences will not be available where a number of
offences, including theft over $5,000, motor vehicle theft, breaking and
entering a place other than a dwelling house, and arson for a fraudulent
purpose, are prosecuted by way of indictment.7 This follows the pattern
of other laws that provide for mandatory minimum sentences or higher
mandatory minimum sentences when hybrid offences are prosecuted by
way of indictment as opposed to summary conviction.8
The Crown’s discretion whether to prosecute by indictment or by
summary conviction has long been accepted as a core element of
prosecutorial discretion and it is difficult to review directly. Indeed,
Canadian law under the Charter is not far removed from what it was
when in 1971 the Supreme Court of Canada rejected a claim under the
Canadian Bill of Rights9 by Conn Smythe, then President of the Toronto
Maple Leafs. Mr. Smythe, represented by no less an advocate than J.J.
Robinette, argued that the Crown’s election to prosecute income tax
evasion by way of indictment as opposed to summary conviction violated
equality before the law. Chief Justice Fauteux rejected this Bill of Rights
claim, stressing that “[e]nforcement of the law and especially of the
criminal law would be impossible unless someone in authority be vested
with some measure of discretionary power.”10
Judicial deference towards the exercise prosecutorial discretion persists under the Charter. To be sure, there have some been changes, such
as the recognition of the ability to bring malicious prosecution lawsuits
7
Safe Streets and Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1, s. 34, amending s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
8
See, for example, Standing Up for Victims of White Collar Crime Act, S.C. 2011, c. 6
with respect to certain fraud prosecutions, and Tackling Violent Crime Act, S.C. 2008, c. 6, s. 8 with
respect to possession of a loaded weapon offence.
9
S.C. 1960, c. 44.
10
R. v. Smythe, [1971] S.C.J. No. 62, [1971] S.C.R. 680, at 686 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Smythe”].
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against prosecutors11 and a recognition of the power of courts to stay
proceedings in cases of abuse of process.12 These doctrines, however,
have been interpreted quite restrictively and, in any event, only provide
remedies against specific instances of proven misconduct. There is
nothing in Charter jurisprudence that encourages courts to review the
substantive fairness of new laws that effectively transfer sentencing
discretion from judges to prosecutors. In R. v. Power,13 for example, the
Court warned of the dangers of “second guessing” the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion and cautioned that such review “would be
conducive to a very inefficient administration of justice”, and that it
might even threaten the impartiality of the courts as an arbiter between
the Crown and the accused as adversaries.
2. The Nixon Case
This relatively deferential view of prosecutorial discretion was recently re-affirmed by a unanimous Supreme Court in R. v. Nixon.14 The
Court affirmed the right of an assistant deputy Attorney General to
withdraw a plea agreement to careless driving with a joint sentence
recommendation of an $1,800 fine in a car accident in which two people
were killed and charges of impaired and dangerous driving causing death
were laid. Justice Charron for the Court held that the decision to repudiate the plea agreement was a matter of prosecutorial discretion and that
the judge below had erred in evaluating the reasonableness of the
exercise of the discretion. She stressed that by
straying into the arena and second-guessing the decision, the reviewing
court effectively becomes a supervising prosecutor and risks losing its
independence and impartiality. Due regard to the constitutionally
separate role of the Attorney General in the initiation and pursuit of
criminal prosecutions puts such decisions “beyond the legitimate reach
of the court” ... Thus, the court does not assess the reasonableness or
correctness of the decision itself; it only looks behind the decision for
“proof of the requisite prosecutorial misconduct, improper motive or
bad faith in the approach, circumstances or ultimate decision to
repudiate”.15
11
12
13
14
15

R. v. Nelles, [1989] S.C.J. No. 86, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Jewitt, [1985] S.C.J. No. 53, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.).
[1994] S.C.J. No. 29, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Power”].
[2011] S.C.J. No. 34, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nixon”].
Id., at para. 52.
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The Court’s approach does not render the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion immune from Charter review. Indeed, the Court indicated that
the repudiation of a plea agreement will satisfy the accused’s threshold
burden on an abuse of process application, and as such will require the
prosecutor to “explain why and how it made the decision not to honour
the plea agreement”.16 At the same time, however, the accused will bear
the ultimate burden of establishing an abuse of process that causes harm
to a fair trial or judicial integrity that cannot be repaired without a stay. In
other words, the accused will have to establish “prosecutorial misconduct, improper motive or bad faith”.17 This burden was not satisfied in
Nixon. Even if the accused can establish an abuse of process in future
cases, any judicial intervention will be episodic and limited to the facts
of the case. There will not be judicial regulation of how prosecutors
exercise the increased power they will have when electing between
different mandatory sentences, or when an election determines whether a
conditional sentence is available.
This approach to the judicial review of prosecutorial discretion will
in almost all cases render the Crown’s discretion to prosecute offences
by summary conviction or indictment resistant to judicial review. As
recognized in Smythe, the Crown’s election is a routine and increasingly
important part of the criminal justice system. Unlike the repudiation of a
plea agreement, the Crown’s discretion to prosecute by indictment will
not satisfy the threshold requirement that allows prosecutorial discretion
to be reviewed on abuse of process grounds. This is true even though
under recent legislation, the Crown’s decision to prosecute by way of
indictment may preclude the option of a conditional sentence or produce
a much higher minimum and maximum sentences than if the case were
prosecuted by summary conviction. Given that the vast majority of
accused plead or are found guilty, the Crown’s power to elect means that
in many cases, the prosecutor becomes the de facto sentencing judge.
3. The Importance of Crown Elections
My point is not to suggest that courts should supervise Crown elections or to suggest that Crown elections are necessarily made for improper or discriminatory purposes. There is no evidence that such is the
case, and given the opaque nature of prosecutorial decision-making,
16
17

Id., at para. 63.
Id., at para. 68.
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there is not likely to be evidence either way. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in
Power18 even went out of her way to suggest that Crown prosecutors
keep their reasons for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion confidential, something that makes judicial review even on limited abuse of
process grounds very difficult.19
It is possible that Crown elections to prosecute by summary conviction may mitigate a significant amount of the potential impact of Bill
C-10 and other parts of the government’s crime control agenda. Such
mitigation could be defended on federalism grounds, as it allows provinces such as Quebec that are uneasy with the government’s crime
agenda to avoid some of its effects. It also means that provincial Crowns
can adjust their election decisions when necessary to control rising prison
populations. This all may be good, but my point is simply that the
Charter will not restrain those crime control measures that give prosecutors more powers based on their election of the mode of trial. The preCharter precedent of Smythe remains good law on the matter of Crown
elections even while Charter cases such as Nixon take pains to make the
case that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is not immune from
Charter and abuse of process review. Judicial review may provide
remedies in rare and egregious cases, but it will not constrain the
enhanced role of prosecutors in sentencing decisions under many new
crime laws, including Bill C-10.
4. Arbitrary Gaps between Punishment on Summary Conviction
and by Indictment
In two recent cases, trial judges in Ontario have held that a two-year
gap between the mandatory minimum sentence for a firearm offence
when prosecuted by indictment and the maximum sentence available
when the same offence is prosecuted by way of summary conviction
violated section 7 of the Charter because no legitimate government
purpose was served.20 These decisions confirm that the statutory context
in which Crown prosecutors exercise the discretion whether to proceed
by indictment or through summary conviction is subject to Charter
review, including review on grounds of arbitrariness. They also confirm
18

Supra, note 13.
For my previous criticisms of this approach, see Kent Roach, “The Attorney General and
the Charter Re-visited” (2000) 50 U.T.L.J. 1.
20
Smickle, supra, note 5; R. v. Nur, [2011] O.J. No. 3878, 2011 ONSC 4874 (Ont. S.C.J.)
[hereinafter “Nur”].
19
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that utterly irrational criminal legislation is vulnerable to section 7
invalidation on the grounds that it is arbitrary in relation to any legitimate
governmental objective. Some might then conclude that courts will use
arbitrariness and gross disproportionality review to control and invalidate
much of the government’s crime agenda.
The above conclusion would, however, be erroneous. The government can easily cure the Charter defects discussed above simply by
raising the maximum penalty when offences are prosecuted under the
more efficient summary conviction procedure so that there is no longer
any arbitrary gap. The maximum penalties for offences that are prosecuted by summary conviction, as with most offences, have been increasing in any event. Such super summary convictions will be easier to
process through the courts, as the accused will be unable to elect either a
preliminary inquiry or trial by jury, and this, along with more frequent
denial of bail, will put pressure on provincial prison populations. The
recently enacted Bill C-10 carefully avoids arbitrary gaps by the expedient of raising maximum sentences in summary conviction offences to 18
and even 24 months’ imprisonment. Such results confirm the pessimistic
warning of critical criminologists such as Doreen McBarnet and the late
Richard Ericson that due process can be used for crime control.21
It will be suggested in the next part of this paper that section 7 review for gross disproportionality and arbitrariness may often turn out to
be a false start in Charter strategies to combat the government’s new
crime agenda. These doctrines build in much deference to governments
and to some extent they mimic the unsuccessful strategies of the Opposition in Parliament to defeat the government’s crime measures. Even if
they are successful, as they were with respect to the arbitrary two-year
gap in punishment found in Nur and Smickle, they may invite the
government to respond, as it did in Bill C-10, by increasing maximum
punishment for summary conviction offences.

III. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND SENTENCING DISCRETION
The Safe Streets and Communities Act, also known as Bill C-10, enacts a broad range of mandatory sentences. As will be discussed in more
detail below, accused can raise a range of Charter challenges to these
sentences. The most traditional argument will be to argue that the
21
Doreen McBarnet, Conviction (London: MacMillan, 1981); Richard Ericson, The Constitution of Inequality (Ottawa: Carlton University Press, 1983).
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mandatory sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment contrary
to section 12 of the Charter. As will be seen, however, such arguments
face a number of challenges, including the Supreme Court’s deference
towards mandatory sentences22 and the possibility that courts will require
accused to demonstrate that the mandatory sentence is grossly disproportionate as applied to them rather than as applied to reasonable hypothetical offenders. Another challenge that accused will face under section 12
of the Charter is that the highest new mandatory sentence in Bill C-10 is
five years’ imprisonment for incest. Although it is easy to imagine a court
striking down that sentence in a case involving truly consenting adults,23
the Supreme Court in R. v. Morrisey24 upheld a mandatory four-year
imprisonment for criminal negligence causing death. Many of Bill C-10’s
new mandatory sentences are perhaps deliberately under four years in an
order to “Charter proof” them or insulate them from review.
In addition to section 12 challenges, the accused can challenge mandatory sentences under section 7 of the Charter. A striking number of
different section 7 challenges to mandatory sentences are possible,
including arguments that mandatory sentences are arbitrary, that they
produce costs that are grossly disproportionate to their benefits, and
finally that they produce punishment that is disproportionate to the
seriousness of particular crimes. These various strategies will be critically assessed below.
1. Crown Elections and Reasonable Hypotheticals Used to Strike
Down Mandatory Sentences
The Supreme Court has so far only struck down one mandatory
minimum sentence enacted by Parliament during the first 30 years of the
Charter. In R. v. Smith25 the Court struck down a seven-year mandatory
minimum sentence for importing narcotics, not on the basis that it was
22
Kent Roach, “Searching for Smith: The Constitutionality of Mandatory Sentences”
(2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 367 [hereinafter “Roach, ‘Searching for Smith’”].
23
Incest is a straight indictable crime. The Supreme Court has stressed that neither the
consent nor age of the complainant is a factor in this crime: R. v. R. (G.), [2005] S.C.J. No. 45,
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 371 (S.C.C.). It has been challenged but upheld under the Charter: R. v. S. (M.),
[1996] B.C.J. No. 2302, 111 C.C.C. (3d) 467 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused 113 C.C.C. (3d)
vii. There are other five-year mandatory minimums, but they apply to aggravated forms of sexual
assault committed against children and can be avoided if the Crown elects to prosecute by summary
conviction.
24
[2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morrisey”].
25
[1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Smith”].
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grossly disproportionate as applied to the particular accused, who
imported seven-and-a-half ounces of cocaine, but on the basis that it
would be unconstitutional if applied to a teenaged first-time offender
who brought a joint of marijuana back to Canada after a spring vacation
in Florida. The Court’s approach in the 1987 Smith decision reflected its
enthusiasm for deciding Charter issues in the early years even if they
were not squarely presented on the facts of the case.26 In subsequent
years, the Court retreated from Smith and in R. v. Goltz27 and Morrisey28
stressed that reasonable hypothetical offenders had to be common
examples of offenders being sentenced in order to be used by the courts
under section 12 in deciding whether a mandatory minimum sentence
might have unconstitutional effects. The one post-Smith case that
succeeded under section 12 involved a real and not a hypothetical
offender.29
Justice Code’s recent decision in Nur30 suggests that accused who
seek to challenge most of the new mandatory minimum sentences may
not even be able to use reasonable hypothetical analysis. In refusing to
strike down a three-year mandatory minimum for a gun offence if
prosecuted by indictment, Code J. observed that the ability to prosecute
by way of summary conviction “is a complete answer to all of the
‘reasonable hypotheticals’” under section 12 of the Charter.31 He stressed
that section 12 Charter review of the mandatory sentence should assume
that the Crown’s discretion to elect to proceed summarily or by indictment is both an “essential feature of the criminal justice system” and one
that will “be exercised in a fair and objective way”.32 At first blush, this
conclusion seems at odds with both the established role that reasonable
hypotheticals have played in the section 12 jurisprudence and the Court’s
warning in Smith that it was not willing to rely on prosecutorial discretion to avoid applying the seven-year penalty to a hypothetical young
first offender. One difference, however, is that the offence examined in
Smith was a straight indictable offence, whereas many of the new
offences that carry mandatory sentences are hybrid offences.
26
See Kent Roach, “Smith and the Supreme Court: Implications for Sentencing Reform and
Policy” (1989) 11 S.C.L.R. 433.
27
[1991] S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485 (S.C.C.).
28
Supra, note 24.
29
Steele v. Mountain Institution, [1990] S.C.J. No. 111, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1385 (S.C.C.).
30
Supra, note 20.
31
Id., at para. 108. See also R. v. Kumar, [1993] B.C.J. No. 2266, 85 C.C.C. (3d) 417
(B.C.C.A.) to similar effect.
32
Nur, id., at para. 114.
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Justice Code warned that reliance on prosecutorial discretion as a
“safety valve” for mandatory sentences for hybrid offences “is not
without risks or costs”. It could lead to the invalidation of mandatory
sentences under section 52 in cases where the Crown fails to elect or reelect to the less severe summary conviction option and a sentence has
cruel and unusual effects on a particular offender.33 The truth of this
proposition is illustrated by the subsequent decision of Molloy J. in
Smickle to strike down the three-year mandatory sentence in a case
where she concluded that a one-year sentence was appropriate for a first
offender prosecuted by way of indictment for the offence of possessing a
loaded firearm. At the same time, it affirms that courts will in the vast
majority of cases not directly review the Crown’s election, but rather the
consequences of that election through the relatively deferential lens of
section 12.
Justice Code’s approach of assuming that the Crown will elect to
proceed by summary conviction with respect to reasonable hypothetical
offenders suggests that the higher mandatory sentences for indictable
offences that have a summary conviction option will be immune from
being struck down on the basis that they could have cruel and unusual
effects as applied to reasonable hypothetical offenders. The American
norm of “as applied” review to real offenders before the court will be
required as it was in Smickle. Courts may well follow Code J. in assuming that even common reasonable hypothetical offenders will benefit
from more lenient mandatory sentences because they will be prosecuted
by summary conviction. In other words, judicial assumptions about the
proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion may contribute to judicial
reluctance to strike down mandatory sentences because they may have
cruel and unusual effects as applied to reasonable hypothetical offenders.
We are a long way from Smith.
2. The Importance of Morrisey
The most relevant case to the government’s crime agenda is Morrisey,34 where the Court upheld a mandatory minimum sentence of four
years for manslaughter committed with a handgun. The sentence in this
case was part of 10 mandatory minimum sentences added to the Criminal
Code by the Liberal government in 1995 gun control amendments.
33
34

Id., at para. 117.
Supra, note 24.
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In Morrisey, the Court held that the four-year sentence was not cruel
and unusual as applied to a 35-year-old first offender who resumed
having alcohol problems after his relationship with the victim’s sister
ended. The accused was suicidal and extremely intoxicated, and killed
the victim, a friend of his, when a shotgun accidentally discharged while
he was trying to get the victim’s attention. He attempted suicide after the
killing, was very remorseful and pleaded guilty to criminal negligence
causing death and unlawfully pointing a firearm. In many ways, it is
difficult to conceive of a more sympathetic killer who would be caught
by the new mandatory sentence. In a case where four Attorneys General
intervened in support of the mandatory sentence and no one other than
the accused opposed it, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the
mandatory sentence.
The Court in Morrisey continued the trend to restraining the use of
hypothetical examples to measure the effects of mandatory sentences by
warning that both hypotheticals and even real cases should only be
considered if they were reasonable and common. Justice Gonthier
stressed that the hypotheticals should “be common examples of the crime
rather than examples of common occurrences in day-to-day life”35 and he
even suggested that reported cases should be used with caution because
the full facts may not be recorded. He discounted the trial judge’s finding
that the killing was unintentional by stressing that “[i]n addition to
causing death using a firearm, the Crown must establish that the accused
acted in a manner that was a marked departure from the standard employed by a reasonable person. Their actions must be wanton or reckless,
and deserving of criminal liability.”36 In this way, the Court took a formal
and thin approach to the seriousness of the crime. It did not really
explore how the accused’s drinking, suicidal tendencies, remorse and
guilty plea may have mitigated the seriousness of his crime. As I have
suggested elsewhere, the Court’s approach in this regard reflected a “just
deserts” approach to sentencing that also saw the Court accept that the
minimum sentence served retributive and denunciatory purposes even
though such punishment might not be required for either specific
deterrence or rehabilitation.37 As will be explored below, the Court’s
recent decision in R. v. Ipeelee; R. v. Ladue38 reflects a thicker and more
contextual understanding of proportionality. In that case, the Court is
35
36
37
38

Id., at para. 33.
Id., at para. 36.
Id., at paras. 47-48, 53. See also Roach, “Searching for Smith”, supra, note 22.
[2012] S.C.J. No. 13, 2012 SCC 13 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ipeelee”].
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concerned not only with the formal definition and fault level of the
offence, but with offender characteristics as they relate to prospects for
specific deterrence, rehabilitation and public protection. The Court
accepts that offender characteristics in some cases may mitigate a
particular offender’s degree of moral blameworthiness for an offence,
and thus affect what punishment is proportionate to the crime.
The Court in Morrisey was not oblivious to the mitigating factors in
the case, but viewed them through the lens of its abstract and formal
discussion of the seriousness of the offence. Justice Gonthier concluded
that he was
not convinced that the mitigating factors offset the aggravating factors
in this case. Nor am I convinced that the mitigating factors displace the
gravity of the offence. The remorse demonstrated by the appellant is
not at all surprising, given the nature of the offence. Nobody is alleging
that the appellant intended to kill Mr. Teed; malice is neither alleged
nor proven. In these circumstances, remorse is to be expected. The
absence of a criminal record is also not surprising, given the nature of
this offence. As the criminally negligent do not intend the results they
cause, acts of criminal negligence are not generally committed as part
of a pattern or a career of criminality.39

If the fault of negligence was sufficient to justify the four-year penalty in
Morrisey, then it may be difficult to overturn many of the new mandatory
sentences in Bill C-10, which often require less than four years’ imprisonment and also require subjective fault in relation to the crime.
3. Smickle versus Stewart: How Deferential Will Judges Be to
Mandatory Sentences?
The above may be unduly pessimistic about the success of Charter
challenges to new mandatory sentences. Justice Molloy of the Ontario
Superior Court recently made headlines when she ruled that a mandatory
minimum sentence of three years’ imprisonment for possession of a
loaded handgun was unconstitutional. Justice Molloy went beyond the
fact that Mr. Smickle knowingly possessed a loaded handgun in concluding that a one-year sentence of imprisonment was appropriate and that
the two additional years required by Parliament were grossly disproportionate. She examined Mr. Smickle’s personal characteristics as an
employed first-time offender with a fiancée and a young child, and
39

Morrisey, supra, note 24, at para. 40.

(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) CHARTER VERSUS THE GOVERNMENT’S CRIME AGENDA

223

stressed that a three-year penitentiary sentence was not necessary to deter
or rehabilitate him.40
Justice Molloy also carefully considered whether the mandatory sentence could be justified under section 1 of the Charter. She accepted that
the mandatory sentence was rationally connected with the very important
objective of deterring the use of firearms in crimes, but held that this
could be done as effectively if Parliament used presumptive sentences
subject to judicially justified and appealable exceptions, as is done in the
United Kingdom and South Africa.41 She eloquently concluded that the
offence
is not a “one-size-fits-all” type of offence. Therefore, some flexibility is
required to deal with those exceptional circumstances where the
imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence would run afoul of the
Charter. The existing legislation is cast too broadly to prevent such
abuse and does not meet the minimal impairment test provided for in
Oakes.42

She warned that the mandatory minimum sentence placed excessive
pressure on the accused to plead guilty if possible to avoid the sentence,
that it could contribute to prison overcrowding and that it could backfire
in terms of rehabilitating by placing first-term offenders in a penitentiary
environment.43
The Crown in Smickle made the unexpected argument that the appropriate remedy in the case was not to strike down the mandatory
minimum sentence under section 52(1), but rather to order it under
section 24(1) to prosecute the case by summary conviction. The Crown
somewhat ironically relied on the Supreme Court’s Insite44 decision as a
justification for such a mandatory remedy. Reflecting the type of judicial
deference discussed in the first part of this paper in cases such as Smythe
and Nixon, Molloy J. concluded that there was no evidence of abuse in
40

Smickle, supra, note 5, at paras. 80-82.
Justice Molloy concluded, id., at para. 113, that
it is possible to impose a presumptive sentence for possession of a loaded weapon, while
still preserving a judicial discretion to be exercised in those rare circumstances where the
presumptive sentence would be grossly disproportionate given the circumstances of the
offender and the offence. In every case where such a judicial discretion is exercised, there
would be a right of appeal, thus providing supervision of the proper use of the discretion.
This would still further the objectives of the legislation without breaching the s. 12 right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
42
Id., at para. 117.
43
Id., at para. 121.
44
Supra, note 4.
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the Crown’s election and that it would not be appropriate to order that the
Crown elect to proceed by summary conviction.45 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Ferguson,46 which held that the appropriate response to unconstitutional mandatory sentences would be to strike
them down in their entirety under section 52(1), Molloy J. then struck
down the sentence for all offenders, holding that a suspended declaration
of invalidity was not appropriate.47 As Benjamin Berger has suggested,48
the Court’s use of the section 52 remedy may speed up dialogue and
confrontation between courts and Parliaments. Indeed, the Smickle
decision is being appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal and may
eventually reach the Supreme Court of Canada. In general, the Crown
will have more incentives to appeal the section 52 invalidation of
mandatory sentences as opposed to the limited impact of the individual
section 24(1) remedy that the Crown unsuccessfully urged on Molloy J.
It may fight section 52(1) battles longer and harder than more limited
section 24(1) cases.49
The Smickle decision is bold and important, but it is not part of a
tidal wave of court decisions invalidating mandatory minimum sentences. In Nur,50 Code J. held that the same mandatory minimum
sentence of three years’ imprisonment for possessing a loaded weapon
would not be cruel and unusual given his finding that the young firsttime offender in that case deserved a sentence of two-and-a-half years’
imprisonment considering the aggravating and gang-related circumstances of the possession of the firearm. In the course of dismissing
challenges to Crown discretion to seek mandatory sentences in drunk
45
Justice Molloy concluded that “[t]here was nothing unconstitutional, or even improper,
about the exercise of the Crown’s discretion and no basis for awarding a remedy based on the
Crown’s conduct. It is the legislation itself that imposes the cruel and unusual punishment in this
case, not anything that was done by the Crown Attorney.” Smickle, supra, note 5, at para. 139. She
then added that
in any event, mandamus requiring the Crown to exercise its discretion in a particular way
is simply not a workable remedy here. That ship has sailed. The Crown has already exercised its discretion to proceed by indictment. The trial is over. A conviction has been
entered. It is too late now to do the whole thing over again as a summary conviction trial,
even if I had jurisdiction to make such an order, which in my view I do not.
Id., at para. 145.
46
[2008] S.C.J. No. 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96 (S.C.C.).
47
Smickle, supra, note 5, at para. 151.
48
Benjamin L. Berger, “A More Lasting Comfort? The Politics of Minimum Sentences, the
Rule of Law and R. v. Ferguson” in J. Cameron, P. Monahan & B. Ryder, eds. (2009) 47 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 101.
49
The Crown may be inclined to commission and present expert evidence in order to avoid
invalidation of a mandatory sentence.
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Supra, note 20.
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driving cases by serving notices of prior offences, Hill J. of the same
Court stated:
While mandatory minimum sentences have become increasingly more
common, the decision to enact criminal law policy in this way is
constitutionally assigned to Parliament. These type of sentences constitute
the law of Canada and agreement or disagreement with the wisdom of
such legislation is not a justiciable matter.51

There was no direct challenge to the mandatory sentences in those cases,
which for a second offence is 30 days and for subsequent offences is 90
days.52
Some trial judges who see the real-life effects of mandatory sentences in their courtrooms on a regular basis may, as Molloy J. did, find
that mandatory sentences are cruel and unusual punishment. Others with
an eye on the Supreme Court’s precedents in this area and their Courts of
Appeal may not. A troubling recent example is the Stewart case from
British Columbia. Both the trial judge and the British Columbia Court of
Appeal had little trouble applying a mandatory one-year sentence to
April Ann Stewart, a 44-year-old woman in rural British Columbia with
no prior convictions who supported two children. While in possession of
a firearm, a 22-calibre rifle, she committed the indictable offence of
being unlawfully in a dwelling house when she confronted and assaulted
another woman with whom Stewart’s husband of 23 years was apparently having an affair. Ms. Stewart was intoxicated at the time of the
offences, did not point or fire the firearm, and left shortly after the
confrontation.
Both the trial judge and the British Columbia of Appeal dismissed
Ms. Stewart’s constitutional challenge to the mandatory one-year
sentence of committing an indictable offence with a firearm. The trial
judge recognized the harmful effect that the one-year sentence would
have on Ms. Stewart and her family, including two children who remained
at home, but stressed that unlawfully being in a dwelling house was a
serious offence and “given Ms. Stewart’s lack of a record and the availability of early release through parole and earned remission, I anticipate
that she will be back with her family and community well before the end
of any sentence I impose upon her”.53 The British Columbia Court of
51
R. v. Mohla; R. v. Singh, [2012] O.J. No. 388, 2012 ONSC 30, at para. 134 (Ont. S.C.J.),
reconsideration allowed [2012] O.J. No. 799, 2012 ONSC 1210 (Ont. S.C.J.).
52
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 255.
53
R. v. Stewart, [2008] B.C.J. No. 259, 2008 BCSC 1741, at para. 41 (B.C.S.C.).
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Appeal unanimously dismissed the accused’s appeal. Justice Frankel
concluded, “it is beyond question that Parliament can require mandatory
punishments to be imposed unless it can be shown that a particular
punishment violates s. 12 of the Charter”. He then ruled that considering
all the circumstances, “including the deference owed to Parliament, I am
unable to conclude that Ms. Stewart has established that the one-year
sentence imposed on her is grossly disproportionate”.54 For every Smickle
there may be more cases like Stewart. Those who challenge many of the
government’s new mandatory sentences under the Charter will face an
uphill battle, especially to the extent that the Crown relies on precedents
such as Morrisey.
4. Reading the Tea Leaves about the Supreme Court’s Approach to
Mandatory Sentences
It remains to be seen what stance the Supreme Court will take when
it reconsiders mandatory sentences, perhaps in Smickle. As suggested
above, its decision in Morrisey suggests that it may be quick to defer to
mandatory sentences. The Court may acknowledge that mandatory
sentences are controversial, but stress that the choice of criminal justice
policy is up to Parliament. The Court took this approach in R. v. Latimer
when it stated: “The choice is Parliament’s on the use of minimum
sentences, though considerable difference of opinion continues on the
wisdom of employing minimum sentences from a criminal law policy or
penological point of view.”55 In my view, such an approach would be
unfortunate because it avoids the reality that only courts are in a position
to see the actual effects of mandatory penalties on real offenders such as
Mr. Smickle and Ms. Stewart. Our trial judges should be prepared to
sound an alarm when mandatory sentences force them to do an injustice.
Justice Molloy’s section 1 analysis in Smickle also suggests that
courts can accept the deterrent and denunciatory objectives of mandatory
sentences as legitimate, yet still ask the hard question of whether these
objectives could be pursued in other ways that infringe rights less.
Indeed, even if the government candidly argues that one of the objectives
of mandatory sentences is to curtail judicial discretion and the court
54

R. v. Stewart, [2010] B.C.J. No. 528, 2010 BCCA 153, at paras. 38, 41 (B.C.C.A.).
[2001] S.C.J. No. 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 88 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Latimer”]. The
author represented the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, which argued that the penalty was
unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Latimer.
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accepted such an objective as sufficiently important to limit Charter
rights, it could still point out the less rights-invasive option of sentencing
guidelines. Both with respect to the effects of mandatory sentences on
real offenders and with respect to less drastic policy measures, courts
have important points to make in a dialogue with Parliament about
mandatory sentences.
5. R. v. Topp
The Supreme Court has recently decided two cases which, while not
directly dealing with mandatory sentences, may be of some relevance in
how the Court will approach such issues. In R. v. Topp,56 the Court
affirmed that section 734(2) of the Criminal Code imposes a burden on a
party seeking a fine to establish to the court that the offender has the
ability to pay the fine. The case involved a Crown appeal after a trial
judge refused to impose a $4.7 million fine on an offender found guilty
of defrauding customs of the same amount. The Court refused to hold
that a judge was bound by law to infer that those involved in economic
crimes still had the necessary funds to pay a fine. The Court noted that
section 734(2) was remedial legislation enacted in 1995 to respond to
evidence that a large number of offenders were being imprisoned for
failure to pay a fine. The decision is difficult to criticize, but it reveals
dilemmas in the sentencing of impoverished offenders. Parliament’s
progressive remedy in 1995 may in today’s environment of restrictions
on conditional sentences push judges towards using imprisonment.
Under the recently enacted Bill C-10, conditional sentences would
no longer be available for either fraud or theft over $5,000. Although it is
possible that a judge might still order probation for such offences, such
an approach would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision
that conditional sentences are a more severe sanction than probation.57 In
any event, Mr. Topp would now be subject to a mandatory minimum
penalty of two years’ imprisonment under the Standing Up for Victims of
White Collar Crime Act58 because he was convicted of a fraud of over $1
million. Such legislation may be politically popular given understandable
outrage over economic crimes. Like other forms of punitive forms of

56
57
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[2011] S.C.J. No. 43, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 119 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Proulx, [2000] S.C.J. No. 6, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61 (S.C.C.).
S.C. 2011, c. 6, s. 2.
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victims’ rights,59 however, sentencing Mr. Topp to a two-year term in a
federal penitentiary may pose something of a false promise to victims of
white-collar crimes despite its promising title. The Standing Up for
Victims of White Collar Crime Act requires a court to consider a restitution order, but courts will be reluctant to make such orders if the offender
does not have the ability to pay. Offenders will be less likely to have the
ability to pay if they are imprisoned. Part of the Safe Streets and Communities Act60 is designed to assist victims of crime, namely, victims of
terrorism, by allowing them to sue selected foreign states who sponsored
terrorism. In both cases, however, the remedies are self-help remedies
that will only benefit a small minority of crime victims fortunate enough
to be eligible. Such punitive and neo-liberal mechanisms are no substitute for more generous victim compensation that should be available for
all crime victims, not just the most visible or politically popular ones.
6. R. v. Ipeelee; R. v. Ladue
Another recent decision that may be of relevance to the Court’s
approach to mandatory sentence is Ipeelee61concerning the sentencing of
Aboriginal offenders. In both cases, the Court indicated that trial judges
had erred in imposing sentences of three years’ imprisonment for
violating non-intoxicant requirements in long-term offender designations.
The case is important with respect to the Court’s reinforcement of the
mandatory duty on trial judges under section 718.2(e) of the Criminal
Code to consider the particular circumstances of Aboriginal offenders in
light of the discriminatory and colonial treatment of Aboriginal people in
Canada, and the growing and gross over-representation of Aboriginal
people in jail.62 The case is also important for the Court’s holding that
even a long-term offender designation involves concern for rehabilitation
as a means of achieving public safety. My focus here, however, will be

59
The concept of punitive victims’ rights being used as a new form of crime control that
gives police and prosecutors more power, without giving victims more power or even compensation,
is described in Kent Roach, Due Process and Victims’ Rights: The New Law and Politics of
Criminal Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
60
S.C. 2012, c. 1, Part I.
61
Supra, note 38. The author represented the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association,
which intervened in Ladue and which opposed the three-year sentence. For a fuller discussion of this
case, see Jonathan Rudin, “Looking Backward, Looking Forward: The Supreme Court of Canada’s
Decision in R. v. Ipeelee”, in B.L. Berger & J. Stribopoulos, eds. (2012) 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 375.
62
See Jonathan Rudin, id.
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more limited. What does Ipeelee portend for the constitutionality of
mandatory sentences?
Although the case was presented in the media as a case solely about
Aboriginal offenders and so-called discounts for Aboriginal offenders,63
the Court in Ipeelee had much to say about proportionality between
crimes and penalties, an issue that will be central to Charter challenges to
mandatory sentences. Justice LeBel stated:
The fundamental principle of sentencing (i.e., proportionality) is
intimately tied to the fundamental purpose of sentencing — the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society through the imposition of
just sanctions. Whatever weight a judge may wish to accord to the
various objectives and other principles listed in the Code, the resulting
sentence must respect the fundamental principle of proportionality.
Proportionality is the sine qua non of a just sanction. First, the principle
ensures that a sentence reflects the gravity of the offence. This is
closely tied to the objective of denunciation. It promotes justice for
victims and ensures public confidence in the justice system. ... Second,
the principle of proportionality ensures that a sentence does not exceed
what is appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender.
In this sense, the principle serves a limiting or restraining function and
ensures justice for the offender. In the Canadian criminal justice system,
a just sanction is one that reflects both perspectives on proportionality
and does not elevate one at the expense of the other.64

Justice LeBel noted that proportionality was rooted in the justice system
well before it was recognized as the fundamental principle of sentencing
in 1996, when section 718.1 of the Criminal Code was enacted. He
added that proportionality
also has a constitutional dimension, in that s. 12 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms forbids the imposition of a grossly
disproportionate sentence that would outrage society’s standards of
decency. In a similar vein, proportionality in sentencing could aptly be
described as a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter.65

The approach to proportionality between crime and punishment in
Ipeelee suggests that the Court may take a thicker and more contextual
approach than previously taken in Morrisey. As discussed above, the
63

“The Wrong Answer to Aboriginal Overincarceration” The Globe and Mail (April 5,
2012); Rod Mickleburgh, “Man who punched bus driver spared jail because of his native ancestry”
The Globe and Mail (April 3, 2012).
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Supra, note 38, at para. 37.
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Court in Morrisey focused on the mens rea requirement of criminal
negligence causing death when judging the seriousness of that crime.66
Mitigating factors such as the facts that the offender was a first-time
offender, was intoxicated and was remorseful did not cause the Court to
determine that the mandatory sentence of four years’ imprisonment
was grossly disproportionate. In contrast, LeBel J. in Ipeelee integrates
offender characteristics and mitigating factors into his discussion of
proportionality. He stresses that proportionality must not only denounce
crimes and reflect concerns for victims, but also ensure justice for the
offender.67 In the context of Aboriginal offenders, this approach requires
judicial notice of systemic factors, as well as Gladue reports that will
explore the background circumstances that bring the offender before the
court and the options available in the community for achieving all the
purposes of sentencing. To the extent that the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders as persons are integrated into the discussion of proportionality in Ipeelee, the Court may be returning to a more contextual approach
to proportionality that characterized Smith,68 where the Court held that a
seven-year sentence would be cruel and unusual as applied to a teenaged
first-time offender bringing a small amount of marijuana across the
border. The Court in Smith held that the mandatory penalty was grossly
disproportionate not simply in relationship to the seriousness of the
importing offence as measured by its requirement of subjective fault, but
also because it was not necessary to deter or rehabilitate the particular
offender and because of its severe effects on a first-time and young
offender.
Justice Lamer in Smith also stressed that the mandatory sentence
cannot be salvaged by relying on the discretion of the prosecution not
to apply the law in those cases where, in the opinion of the prosecution,
its application would be a violation of the Charter. To do so would be
to disregard totally s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which provides
that any law which is inconsistent with the Constitution is of no force
or effect to the extent of the inconsistency and the courts are duty
bound to make that pronouncement, not to delegate the avoidance of a
violation to the prosecution or to anyone else for that matter.69
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See supra, notes 34-39.
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He also accepted that the mandatory sentence was rationally connected to
the important objective of deterring and punishing the importation of
illegal drugs, but held that the
net cast ... for sentencing purposes need not be so wide as that cast ...
for conviction purposes. The result sought could be achieved by limiting
the imposition of a minimum sentence to the importing of certain
quantities, to certain specific narcotics of the schedule, to repeat offenders,
or even to a combination of these factors.70

It remains to be seen whether in the section 12 context, the Court
will embrace the more contextual and offender-sensitive vision of proportionality in Ipeelee, or whether it will be drawn back to the approach in
Morrisey which focuses more on the abstract seriousness of the offence.
In my view, the Court should take a more generous approach that
incorporates a range of offender characteristics and mitigating factors
that Parliament cannot possibly imagine when it enacts a mandatory
sentence. To be sure, such an approach will be greeted by critics on both
the right and the left with their well-rehearsed charges of judicial
activism and interference with legislative policy. The Court should not be
swayed by such criticisms, especially at the level of interpreting the
relevant Charter right. The government will have its day in court, so to
speak, in justifying the law under section 1.
7. Is Proportionality between Crime and Punishment a New
Principle of Fundamental Justice?
It is commonplace that the state of the principles of fundamental
justice under section 7 is complex and for many confusing.71 In the
recent Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General)72 case, the Ontario Court
of Appeal applied three different principles of fundamental justice: (1) a
requirement that a law not be arbitrary to its ends; (2) a requirement that
it not be overbroad to its objectives; and (3) a requirement that there be
no gross disproportionality between the effects of a law in achieving the
government’s objective and its impact on rights. The Supreme Court in

70

Id., at para. 72.
But see Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012), at 154
[hereinafter “Stewart”] for clear explanations of the relevant concepts.
72
[2012] O.J. No. 1296, 2012 ONCA 186 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Bedford”].
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the Insite case73 recognized, but did not resolve, disagreements within the
Court on determining whether a law was arbitrary.
Justice LeBel in Ipeelee may have introduced yet another principle
of fundamental justice into the mix when he stated that “proportionality
in sentencing could aptly be described as a principle of fundamental
justice under s. 7 of the Charter”.74 The Court’s casual75 recognition of
proportionality between crime and punishment as a principle of fundamental justice is surprising given its findings in R. v. Malmo-Levine:
To find that gross and excessive disproportionality of punishment is
required under s. 12 but a lesser degree of proportionality suffices
under s. 7 would render incoherent the scheme of interconnected
“legal rights” set out in sections 7 to 14 of the Charter by attributing
contradictory standards to sections 12 and 7 in relation to the same
subject matter. Such a result, in our view, would be unacceptable.76

Nevertheless, there is a strong case that proportionality between crime
and punishment satisfies the three-part test for a principle of fundamental
justice. It is a legal principle that was recognized by Parliament in 1996
as the fundamental principle of sentencing and, although there are
different versions of proportionality, it can be defined with precision.77 It
is also possible that courts might be bolder in applying a separate section
7 principle of proportionality between a crime and a sentence. In particular, given the social consensus on proportionality, it might not require
that a sentence shock the public conscience or public decency before it
qualifies as a disproportionate sentence.
Justice LeBel’s reference to proportionality between crime and punishment as a principle of fundamental justice may open a door that the
Court closed in Malmo-Levine78 and allow a two-pronged approach when
challenging mandatory penalties. The first would be gross disproportionality between the crime and punishment review under section 12 of the
Charter. As suggested above, the Court has since Smith79 been quite
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deferential to Parliament in this review. In Morrisey,80 the Court took an
abstract approach to offence seriousness and in Latimer,81 the Court
stressed deference to Parliament’s decision to elevate some sentencing
purposes over others when enacting mandatory sentences. The Court has
also suggested that only commonly occurring reasonable hypotheticals
should be used, and Code J.’s decision in Nur82 suggests that even
common hypotheticals may not be considered if the Crown can avoid
imposing a mandatory sentence by electing to proceed by way of
summary conviction. A separate section 7 approach might avoid some of
these restraints.
8. Templates for a Section 7 Requirement of Proportionality
between Crime and Punishment
There are also some templates for a section 7 approach to proportionality between crime and punishment. The first is Wilson J.’s concurrence in Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) s. 94(2),83
where she held that an absolute liability offence violated section 7 of the
Charter because it resulted in a mandatory seven days’ imprisonment that
was disproportionate to the offence. Although she conceded that proportionality between punishment and crime cannot be determined “with
mathematical precision”, Wilson J. concluded that a fit proportion
between crime and punishment was a principle of fundamental justice
traditionally used by trial judges in the exercise of their sentencing
discretion. In contrast to the narrow and formal approach taken in
Morrisey, Wilson J. stressed the need to consider “many different factors”
in determining the seriousness of the offence. In this way, she recognized
both the breadth of many offences and the relevance of the different
circumstances under which offences could be committed. She concluded
that seven days’ imprisonment for an absolute liability offence was
“grossly excessive and inhumane. It is not required to reduce the incidence of the offence. It is beyond anything required to satisfy the need
for ‘atonement’.”84
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Justice Arbour in her dissent in Malmo-Levine85 also stressed that the
fit between a crime and its punishment should be assessed under section
7 as well as under section 12 of the Charter. She stressed the possibility
of imprisonment for the offence of marijuana possession and was less
convinced than the majority that the existence of sentencing discretion
would prevent the use of imprisonment for marijuana possession. Both of
these approaches are promising because they focus on whether mandatory penalties are arbitrary and unjust in particular cases. They suggest
that mandatory penalties, even of a week or more in prison, may still be
arbitrary and disproportionate when applied in particular cases, and even
if they are not so excessive as to shock public conscience or decency.
Both of these templates provide a starting point for thinking about a
section 7 requirement of proportionality between crime and punishment
that could be distinct and perhaps less demanding than the section 12
standard, which seems to require high levels of punishment that are
shocking to a public that seems to be in a more fearful, mean and
punitive mood.
9. Arbitrariness and Gross Disproportionality: Should the Focus
Be on Individual Offenders or Broader Legislative Objectives?
Allan Manson draws on references to arbitrariness in B.C. Motor
Vehicles to call for re-invigorated judicial review of mandatory sentences
to focus on what he calls “arbitrary disproportionality”.86 Debra Parkes
makes a somewhat similar argument.87 Professors Manson and Parkes
cite in support the section 7 jurisprudence on arbitrariness in Chaoulli v.
Quebec (Attorney General)88 and in the Insite case89 as support for a
more robust approach to Charter review of mandatory sentences. I share
the desires of both of my colleagues for more robust Charter review of
mandatory sentences, but I am not enthusiastic about relying on Chaoulli
and Insite. These section 7 cases speak to the relation between legislative
objectives and impugned measures. Courts may well find that mandatory
sentences are not arbitrary in relation to Parliament’s objective of deterring
85
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and punishing crime. Mandatory sentences are an attempt to increase the
certainty and severity of punishment, two central elements of deterrence.
In this sense, mandatory sentences may rarely be arbitrary to Parliament’s purposes, especially with respect to crimes that are more serious
than driving with a suspended licence or possession of marijuana. In
section 1 language, there may often be a rational connection between the
legislative objective of punishment and deterrence, and the mandatory
sentence.
In my view, the real mischief of mandatory sentences is not so much
in their macro relation to legislative purposes, but in their micro application to individual offenders. In exceptional cases, the imposition of a
mandatory sentence on a particular offender may be arbitrary and not
rationally connected to the aims of punishment, but only in that and
similar cases. In many respects, the appropriate judicial remedy would be
a constitutional exemption, but it appears after Ferguson90 that such a
tailored remedy will not be available. Although cases such as Latimer91
and Ferguson may direct courts to these larger policy questions, there is
in my view a need to keep judges focused on the harmful effects that
mandatory sentences will impose on particular offenders. It will be easier
to focus on the individual offender under more traditional understandings
of proportionality that examine the fit between punishment and particular
crimes and offenders, than under more novel concepts of arbitrariness
and gross disproportionality that focus on legislative objectives. In these
difficult times, courts should stick to their traditional strengths.92
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In an interesting extra-judicial speech, Justice Fish contrasted utilitarian and retributive approaches to sentencing and suggested that the
principle of proportionality resides in the latter tradition. He took note of
the increasing use of mandatory sentences in Canada and suggested that
Canadian judges are obliged by law to impose the stipulated minimum
custodial terms of imprisonment even when they consider it unjust to
do in view of the particular circumstances of the offence or the
offender. In such instances, the sentence commanded by the specific
provision of the law is plainly inconsistent with the principle of
proportionality ... .93

These statements suggest that judges may believe that they are on firmer
grounds in declaring that Parliament has unconstitutionally authorized
disproportionate punishment for particular offenders who commit crimes
in particular circumstances than in evaluating and appearing to secondguess the utilitarian value of mandatory sentences. It is also significant
that Justice Fish, in line with the Court’s 1987 decision in Smith and its
subsequent decision in Ipeelee, described proportionality as a matter that
focuses not simply on the crime, but also on the offender and the particular circumstances under which the offence was committed.
The broader policy analysis of whether mandatory sentences are arbitrary or grossly disproportionate to legislative objectives contemplated
in Malmo-Levine, Chaoulli and Insite may only invite judicial deference.
Courts may well hold that Parliament is entitled at a macro level to
assume that mandatory sentences will fulfil legislative objectives and to
decide to stress certain objectives such as deterrence over others such as
rehabilitation and restraint. Even if they are successful, rulings that
mandatory sentences are arbitrary or grossly disproportionate may only
invite replies that simply re-assert that such mandatory sentences achieve
broader legislative objectives and the commissioning of research designed to demonstrate such results. It will be suggested below that such
broader policy analysis of the effectiveness and necessity of mandatory
sentences should be restricted to section 1, where the government bears
the burden of justification.
Although a full examination of gross disproportionality review is
beyond the scope of this paper, I have doubts that gross disproportionality or arbitrariness review will nullify much of the government’s crime
agenda. The Insite case should be read carefully because the Court was
93

Fish, supra, note 77, at 69.
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evaluating the gross disproportionality not of a law itself, but only of the
Minister’s denial of an exemption to a particular safe injection site in
Vancouver. The decision was actually more limited than those of the
courts below, which addressed the constitutionality of the drug laws.94
The majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bedford95 also demonstrates much caution in applying the new section 7 doctrines. It specifically warned about the dangers of underestimating the benefits of
criminal law and the need for the harms of criminal law clearly to
outweigh the benefits to justify a court striking the law down.96 In some
respects, gross disproportionality analysis seems to mimic the attempts
by the parliamentary opposition to argue that the costs of mandatory
sentences outweigh their benefits.
Gross disproportionality analysis may work in some cases such as
Bedford where there may be extensive social science to call on in
measuring the effects of criminal law, but it may be less useful in
evaluating the deterrent effect of drug and other laws, given the difficulties of evaluating the effectiveness of such laws.97 Indeed, the costs of
Bill C-10 have been a moving target. They have ranged from the
government’s prediction of $78 million to much higher estimates, and
the parliamentary budget officer has encountered difficulties in costing
the law.98 The costs of Bill C-10 remain quite unclear despite the fact
that the 2011 election was fought in part on the basis of the government’s
refusal to reveal the costs of its crime control initiatives. The effectiveness of Bill C-10 will be even more difficult to measure. Those who wish
to challenge its mandatory sentences may be better advised to focus on
its disproportionate effects on particular offenders rather than attempting
to prove that the sentences are arbitrary or grossly disproportionate to its
legislative objectives.
Gross disproportionality and arbitrariness review may often boil
down to trials by social science experts. Although Charter applicants
succeeded in both Insite and Bedford, the government has the deeper
94
See Kent Roach, “The Supreme Court’s Remedial Decision in the Insite Case” (2012) 5
J. Parliamentary & Political L. 246.
95
Supra, note 72.
96
Id., at paras. 300-305.
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Even with respect to well-studied initiatives such as anti-drunk driving initiatives, deterrence is notoriously difficult to either establish or debunk: H.L. Ross, Deterring the Drinking Driver,
2d ed. (Washington: Lexington Books, 1989).
98
Marianne White, “Controversial crime bill to cost Canadians 19 billion: Study” Vancouver Sun (December 8, 2011), online: <http://www.vancouversun.com/Controversial+crime+bill+
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pockets when it comes to hiring and commissioning experts. If the
government loses a case on arbitrariness and gross disproportionality,
such as the arbitrary gap in punishment found in Nur and Smickle, it may
respond simply by increasing punishment or devoting more resources to
demonstrating the effectiveness of the measure. In contrast, a finding
that a mandatory sentence is unconstitutional because of its effects on
exceptional offenders may force the government to provide judges with
the discretion to depart from the sentence in exceptional cases. Alternatively, it may force the government to reaffirm mandatory sentences by
using the override under section 33.99
Without dismissing gross disproportionality review entirely, I am
more optimistic about traditional arguments that mandatory sentences
will result in punishment that is grossly disproportionate to particular
crimes committed by particular offenders. Evaluating the proportionality
between the crime and the punishment is within the traditional domain
and expertise of the courts.100 Evaluating the degree to which mandatory
sentences fulfil legislative objectives and balancing the social benefits
against the social costs of laws is not within the judiciary’s traditional
domain of expertise, at least outside the section 1 context.
Courts do not need expert evidence to measure the proportionality of
punishment imposed by Parliament against particular crimes committed
by particular offenders. Trial judges are in an excellent position to see the
nuances of offending behaviour, the tragic backgrounds of some offenders and the devastating harms that mandatory sentences will have on
particular offenders and their families. The concrete adjudicative facts
found by trial judges in cases like Smickle may be more compelling than
speculative legislative facts based on the testimony of criminologists,
political scientists, philosophers and economists about the government’s
legitimate objectives of deterring and punishing serious crimes and the
social costs and benefits of such measures. That said, the courts’ concerns about invalidating mandatory sentences under Ferguson, as well as
the need to determine whether even unconstitutional mandatory sentences can be justified, may well force the accused to join the broader
policy issues about the effectiveness of mandatory sentences. In my
99
Parkes, supra, note 87. Public opinion research cited by Professor Parkes suggests that
the public may have some sympathy with exceptional offenders affected by mandatory sentences.
100
This concept was explained by Lamer J. in Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the
Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.) and has been defended
by Jamie Cameron in “From the MVR to Chaoulli v. Quebec: The Road Not Taken and the Future of
Section 7” in J. Cameron, P. Monahan & B. Ryder, eds. (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 105.
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view, the best place for the accused to fight such a battle is under section
1, where the government with all its superior resources bears the burden
of justification.
10. Engaging the Government’s Crime Agenda under Section 1:
Who’s Afraid of Section 1?
Justice Molloy’s section 1 analysis in Smickle suggests that courts
could respectfully engage with Parliament about the merits of mandatory
minimum sentences. In Smickle, Molloy J. accepted that the government’s objective of controlling gun violence was important enough to
justify the limitation of Charter rights. She noted that no evidence was
presented to establish the rational connection between this objective and
the mandatory sentence, but she was prepared to assume that there was a
rational connection. Justice Molloy then concluded that the mandatory
sentence did not violate the Charter as little as possible because
it is possible to impose a presumptive sentence for possession of a
loaded weapon, while still preserving a judicial discretion to be exercised
in those rare circumstances where the presumptive sentence would be
grossly disproportionate given the circumstances of the offender and
the offence.101

She added that any judicial departures from the presumptive sentence
could be appealed and that the presumptive sentence approach was
consistent with approaches used in the United Kingdom and South
Africa.
Moving to the last stage of the section 1 test, Molloy J. noted that
while “every reasonable person would support reducing violent crime
and protecting the public”,102 there was no evidence that mandatory
sentences were an effective deterrent. Justice Molloy then balanced the
objectives of the law against its harmful effects, not only with respect to
the violation of sections 7 and 12 but also with respect to
(1) the sentence inflation for persons who, although not deserving a
sentence of less than a one year sentence, must now receive at least
three years; (2) the danger of increased recidivism by incarcerating
youthful first offenders for extended periods of time with hardened
criminals; (3) contributing to the over-crowded conditions in our
correctional facilities; (4) the systemic disincentive for guilty pleas and
101
102
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early resolutions if the minimum sentence will be three years in prison
for any offender charged with the indictable offence; and, (5) as the
Supreme Court noted in Smith, the unfair advantage given to the Crown
as an accused will be under pressure to plead guilty to a lesser included
offence in order to avoid the risk of the mandatory minimum.103

The section 1 analysis in Smickle suggests that there could be a genuine
dialogue between courts and legislatures over crime control measures. In
this dialogue, courts can defer to legislative crime control objectives
while at the same time objectively assessing whether such objectives
could be fulfilled by less drastic measures, such as the use of presumptive as opposed to mandatory sentences.
The dialogue that occurred between the Court and Parliament in
Smickle might, however, seem weighted in the direction of rejecting the
government’s attempt to justify mandatory sentences, given that Molloy
J. prefaced the section 1 analysis by doubting that violations of sections 7
and 12 could ever be justified under section 1.104 The Ontario Court of
Appeal similarly observed in Bedford that “[w]hile non-compliance with
s. 7 can theoretically be justified under s. 1 of the Charter, in reality s. 1
will rarely, if ever, trump a s. 7 infringement.”105 Both courts accurately
reflected Supreme Court jurisprudence, which has never held that a
violation of section 7 (or of section 12) is justified under section 1.106
In my view, there is no need to place such a thumb on the section 1
balancing scales.
Section 1 is the real focus of dialogue or interaction between courts
and legislatures.107 The reluctance of the Supreme Court to hold that
violations of either section 7 or section 12 of the Charter can ever be
justified under section 1 of the Charter has arguably made the Court less
generous when interpreting those rights because of the difficulty of
governments justifying exceptions to those rights.108 Indeed, it is possible
103
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to argue that all mandatory penalties should infringe section 7 or section
12 on separation of powers grounds alone as infringing the right of
judges to determine fit sentences, while also conceding that particular
mandatory sentences might be justified by the government under section 1.
Courts should evaluate mandatory sentences straight up. In many
cases, they may conclude, as the Court did in Smickle, that there are less
drastic alternatives and that the effects of the mandatory sentences on
offenders outweigh their often uncertain benefits in advancing the
government’s objectives, but there may be some cases where mandatory
sentences can be justified. Such a dialogue should be conducted under
section 1, where the government with its superior resources will have the
burden of justification and uncertainties will be resolved against the
government rather than through an interpretation of section 7 or section
12 of the Charter. Accused who seek to challenge mandatory sentences as
arbitrary or grossly disproportionate will have to prove that the government has been irrational, whereas the government will have to justify
mandatory sentences as rational and necessary governmental policy
under section 1.
An open and full section 1 analysis may also allow the Court to
speak more directly to the government and its supporters about their
strongly held concerns about crime. As Molloy J.’s approach in
Smickle109 demonstrates, courts can cheerfully accept the legitimacy of
the government’s crime control objectives and even its objective in
controlling judicial sentencing discretion, but still conclude that mandatory sentences are not necessary. A full section 1 analysis was conducted
in many landmark section 7 cases, including R. v. Vaillancourt,110 R. v.
Martineau111 and R. v. Charkaoui,112 and the judicial decisions were the
better for it. In many cases, there will be a range of less rights-invasive
means to pursue the various objectives in the government’s crime
agenda. Even in cases where there may be no reasonable alternatives, the
harms of the new laws to Charter rights and particular offenders will

principle of fundamental justice. For criticism of such a requirement for s. 7 rights, see Peter Hogg,
“The Brilliant Career of Section 7 of the Charter”, in this volume. A willingness to hold that some
violations of s. 12 could be justified under s. 1 might also make courts less concerned about finding
that mandatory sentences outrage public decency or shock the conscience. For criticism of such
requirements for s. 12 violations, see Manson, supra, note 86.
109
Supra, note 5.
110
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often be great and certain compared to the uncertain social benefits of
mandatory sentences.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Safe Streets and Communities Act relies on prosecutorial discretion and a general judicial reluctance to strike down mandatory sentences. The government has shrewdly capitalized on those areas of the
law that will make it difficult for the accused to convince courts to strike
down laws under the Charter. This is not to say that Charter challenges
are impossible, only that they will be difficult. In particular, the use of
reasonable hypothetical in section 12 analysis may be precluded by
reliance on the assumption that longer mandatory sentences will not be
applied because the Crown has the power to avoid such sentences by
electing to prosecute the relevant crime by way of summary conviction.
Courts will, as under the pre-Charter case of Smythe113 and as confirmed
most recently by the Court in Nixon,114 be reluctant to review such
exercises of prosecutorial discretion, and it will not be possible in most
cases for accused to establish that an abuse of process has occurred.
The Supreme Court ultimately will have to decide whether it wishes
to maintain the level of judicial deference towards mandatory sentences
seen in cases such as Morrisey.115 The government has rarely exceeded
four years in its new mandatory sentences. Some, but not all, lower
courts have interpreted Morrisey as a sign that they should be extremely
deferential to mandatory sentences. The section 12 jurisprudence and the
new section 7 proportionality principle briefly mentioned in Ipeelee116
hinge on requirements that punishment be proportionate to crimes. There
are resources in proportionality jurisprudence to focus not only on the
abstract seriousness of the crime as measured by its mens rea, but on the
particular circumstances of the offence and the offender. A seven-year
mandatory penalty was struck down in Smith117 because of both the
breadth of the importing narcotics offence and the fact that the offender
the Court was concerned about was a young first-time offender. The facts
in Smickle118 — a first-time offender who supported children and made a
113
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stupid albeit criminal mistake — made all the difference to the court’s
conclusion. Ipeelee points towards a richer and more contextual understanding of moral blameworthiness that makes room for consideration of
how the particular characteristics and background of offenders may
affect what is necessary to punish, deter and rehabilitate them.
Despite this potential, proportionality analysis conducted under either
section 7 or section 12 of the Charter could still be quite deferential to
the new mandatory sentences, especially those that can be mitigated
by the prosecutor’s discretion to elect to proceed under less punitive
summary conviction procedures and those that are of a shorter duration.
The Court could stick with the deference towards Parliament’s decision
to use mandatory sentences seen in cases such as Morrisey and Latimer.119
Although the Insite120 and Bedford121 cases produced Charter victories, it
is far from clear that accused will be able to use those precedents to
demonstrate that the new mandatory sentences are arbitrary or grossly
disproportionate to the government’s legislative objectives in deterring
and punishing crimes or controlling judicial discretion. It is possible that
the Canadian criminal justice system could be made much more punitive,
harsher and meaner without violating Charter norms. The Charter may
not save us from ourselves and the governments we elect. The very real
possibility that the Charter will achieve little in curbing the government’s
crime agenda would confirm that judicial review of prosecutorial
discretion and mandatory sentences remains a weak spot in Charter
jurisprudence. This prospect dampens my celebration of the 30th
anniversary of the Charter.

119
120
121

Supra, note 55.
Supra, note 4.
Supra, note 72.

